Events
Love is in the coffee break.
Events
Love is in the coffee break.
Events
Love is in the coffee break.
Events
Love is in the coffee break.
Events
Love is in the coffee break.
Events
Love is in the coffee break.
Events
Love is in the coffee break.
Management
Management
Governance is beautiful.
Governance is beautiful.
Comparison of legislation
A comparison tracker of current and future digital competition legislation
Step 1: Designation phase
The legislations target large online platforms designated by the enforcer under quantitative and qualitative or only qualitative criteria.
Feature | Germany | Europe | United Kingdom | United States | Australia |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Status | In force | In force (in November 2022) | Under preparation | Under the legislative process | recommendation |
Type of legislation | Competition law with ex-ante rules | Ex-ante regulation | Ex-ante regulation (codes of conduct) | Ex-ante regulation | Ex-ante regulation (codes of conduct) |
Enforcer | Competition authority | Competition authority | Competition authority | Competition authority | N/S |
Application | Digital sector | Some digital markets (e.g., online search engines) | Some digital markets (to be defined) | Some digital markets (e.g., operating systems) | Some digital markets (to be defined) |
Terminology | Firms with paramount significance for competition across markets | Gatekeeper | Firms with strategic market status | Covered platforms | Designated digital platforms |
Criteria | Qualitative | Quantitative and qualitative | Quantitative and qualitative | Quantitative and qualitative | Quantitative and/or qualitative |
Designation process | By the competition authority | Notification by the firm | By the competition authority | By the competition authority | By the regulator or Minister |
Term | Five years | Five years | Five years | Seven years | N/S |
Step 2: Compliance phase
Legislations tackle similar behaviours , but bear in mind that the exact content and scope of each obligation and interdiction vary among legislations. For instance, in Europe, the DMA specifically mandates interoperability between messaging services (art. 7 DMA), whereas interoperability requirements in the other legislations do not specifically concern messaging services. Therefore, please refer to the source for an in-depth understanding of the content of each legislation.
Feature | Germany | Europe | United Kingdom | United States | Australia |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Type of approach | Rules-based and effect-based | Rules-based and object-based | Principles-based and effect-based | Rules-based and effect-based | Principles-based and effect-based
|
Don't: Self-preferencing | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Don't: Unfair terms and conditions | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Don't: Tying/Bundling | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Don't: Anti-steering strategies (e.g., MFN) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Don't: Lock-in strategies (e.g., un-install software) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Don't: Combine data from different sources | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No |
Don't: Use of non-public data | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
Do: Data access | Yes (private enforcement) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Do: Interoperability | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Do: Portability | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Do: Data silos | Yes | Yes (if systematic infringement) | Yes | No | Yes |
Do: Open Standard | No | No | Yes | No | No |
Do: Data Sandboxes | No | No | Yes | No | No |
Do: Data Trustees | No | No | Yes | No | No |
Do: Short data retention periods | No | No | Yes | No | No |
Mergers | No specific rules (but the competition authority can mandate notification after a sector inquiry) | Mandatory information of all intended acquisitions in the digital sector | Mandatory notification of acquisitions that meet quantitative and qualitative criteria | No specific rules | No |
Sanctions | Fine | Fine | Fine (firm and senior managers) | Fine | Fine |
Remedy: Behavioral and structural | Yes (structural only if behavioral remedies are ineffective) | Yes | Yes (structural only if behavioral remedies are ineffective) | Yes | Yes |
Remedy: Prohibition of mergers | No | Yes | No | No | No |
Remedy: Director removal | No | No | Yes | No | No |
Source: Christophe Carugati based on OECD G7 inventory of new rules for digital markets and OECD Analytical note on the G7 inventory of new rules for digital markets and for Australia ACCC Digital platform services inquiry Interim report No. 5 – Regulatory reform (last updated November 2022). Please note that the above tables are only for information purposes on the main features of the digital competition legislations. It is not legal advice. The table excludes Japan as its law does not impose a list of do's and don’ts to tackle anticompetitive behaviours.